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IDEAL TO LAW TO PRACTICE:
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TODAY AND TOMORROW
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GraduateInstitute of InternationalStudies (Geneva);
Global Professor, New York University Law School

Louis Sohn
George Washington University Law School

Theodor Meron
New York University Law School

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for coming. My name is Paul Chevigny. I am a
Professor of Law at New York University (N.Y.U.) Law School.
I am honored to be able to introduce this distinguished
panel. I will follow Professor Flaherty's lead and introduce
them all at the beginning in the order they will speak.
The first is Professor Louis Sohn. There is a biographical
article about him in the current Human Rights Quarterlyreferring to him as "the grandfather of human rights." He has participated in the drafting of a great many of the documents that
are being discussed here today. He is now the Distinguished
Research Professor at George Washington University Law
School in the District of Columbia. He has previously been professor at Georgia and for many years at Harvard. He is the au69
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thor of books on the international protection of human rights
and the Law of the Sea.
Professor Georges Abi-Saab is a global law professor at
N.Y.U. Law School in this country, but abroad he is a professor
of international law at the Graduate Institute of International
Studies in Geneva. He has participated in many international
tribunals and is at present a member of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 1
Professor Theodor Meron of our faculty at N.Y.U. Law
School is a long-time distinguished scholar in the field of international human rights. He is the author of many books, most
2
recently Bloody Constraint:War and Chivalry in Shakespeare,
and also War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 3 both published in November 1998.

1 Professor Abi-Saab is actually a former member of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, per Professor Abi-Saab's own statement at
the conference. (Transcript p. 72).
2 THEODOR MERON,

BLOODY CONSTRAINT:

WAR

AND CHIVALRY

IN

SHAKE-

SPEARE (1998).
3 THEODOR MERON,

WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE (1998). Note that
although the speaker indicates November as the month of publication for this

work, it was actually published in October, 98.
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Louis Sohn
George Washington University Law School
With all these excellent speeches that we heard in the first
part, it remains for me only to clarify a few things and present a
few views that differ from some previous statements.
First, I would like to talk a little more about the person who
really started the whole business. His first statement was originally accepted by all, but his later elaborations of it were ignored by a more conservative Congress. It was President
Roosevelt. I just happened to listen to his speech in 1941, and
that speech made me change from private international law, in
which I was specializing at the time, to international public law,
especially international organizations and human rights, and I
was able after a few years to pioneer in teaching this subject. In
today's short statement, I am obliged to limit myself to clarifying President Roosevelt's role, and to sketching a few of the
steps that have been taken to develop a novel topic - human
rights.
My first clarification relates to President Roosevelt's "Four
Freedoms."' They are often mentioned, and three of them found
a friendly reception. But one - freedom from want - is usually

neglected. Very few have noticed that in an earlier part of his
speech the President explained what he meant by it. He
pointed out that it was very important to think about "the social
and economic problems which are the root cause of the social
revolution which is today a supreme factor in the world."
Then he said: there are some important freedoms that everybody should have, namely, a quality of opportunity for youth
and for others, jobs for those who can work, security for those
who need it, the ending of special privileges for the few, the
preservation of civil liberties for all, and the enjoyment of the
fruits of scientific programs in a wider and constantly rising
standard of living. 2
1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLiN DELANO ROOSEVELT,

1940,

War and Aid to Democracies 663, 672 (1941).
2 Id. at 670-71.
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He said all those things. In fact, the whole business was
the result of the fact that somebody asked him, "What do you
mean by 'freedom from want'?" He mentioned this subject already in one of the earlier discussions with journalists, but not
in a public speech. He replied: "You know, I have not studied it
carefully, but I shall mention it next time."
His assistant later wrote that from that point on he collected little pieces of paper, as he usually did, on which he wrote
notes, one right after another. He discovered they were being
mentioned without people realizing the context. He got that list
and he stuck more or less to that list, because over the years he
got pressed by other organizations to discuss, the problem.
As was pointed out already, there were quite a number of
organizations meeting between 1943 and 1945 in which the
matter was discussed in the United States. At those meetings a
variety of proposals were made, in addition to the other very
important book on the subject that Professor Lauterpacht wrote
in England at that time. So that idea was clearly in the air.
But just before preparations for the United Nations conference at San Francisco got started, another thing happened.
One of the people that got interested was a Latin American
leader, Professor Ricardo Alfaro from Panama, who was in the
previous years also president of his country and its foreign minister. At that time he was the president of something else, the
Inter-American Institute of International Law.
Mr. Alfaro discovered that there was also an American Law
Institute and he came there to ask them if they would be willing
to cooperate with him in presenting an International Bill of
Human Rights like President Roosevelt proposed. Taking this
idea seriously, Mr. William Draper Lewis, the Secretary-General of the American Law Institute, selected a group of U.S. experts, and Mr. Alfaro, on behalf of his Institute, collected a
group of people from Europe, from Latin America, even from
Africa and Asia, who happened to be in New York or Washington and put them to work together.
Very interestingly, in 1998 was also an anniversary of the
American Law Institute, and the Institute published a little
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book on this anniversary. 3 A large part of it is taken by their
work on this Declaration of Human Rights. It is a very interesting little book.
In it the Institute explained what was happening. If you
look then into the Institute records, you see also a very interesting discussion on this subject, especially between the American
members of the Institute and the foreigners, whether they were
coming from Europe, from Asia, or from Latin America.
The discussion was, like Professor Schachter pointed out,
about the fact that there are some old civil and political rights,
there are new economic and social rights, and there are the
group rights, for instance, those of minorities.
In his last year, in 1944, just before his death, President
Roosevelt wrote another message to Congress in which he had a
revised list of rights similar to that he had discussed at the beginning. He called it "the Second International Bill of Rights
for the United States and for everybody else."4 In it he had the
same list, but better formulated.
Mr. Alfaro just loved it and took it up, together with the one
from the Institute. He became, of course, a member of the Panamanian delegation to the 1945 San Francisco Conference that
established the United Nations. He assumed the leadership
role in the Latin American group on the topic of human rights.
In particular, he insisted on inserting a declaration on human
rights either in the Charter or in an annex to it. The Conference ran into various difficulties on problems of international
peace and security, and Alfaro was told that the Conference had
not time left to actually prepare a complicated document on
human rights. Alfaro responded: "All right, let's then make
sure that we draft it immediately as a supplement to the Charter." And, as a result of their discussion, they also put several
articles in the Charter, in the Preamble, and in the statement of
main purposes of the United Nations (Article 1), and Articles 55
5
and 56.
3 The American Law Institute, Seventy-Fifth Anniversary, 1923-1998 (Philadelphia, 1998) 133-42, 261-89.
4 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 1, 1944-1945 (ed. By S.J. Rosenman, 1950) at
32, 40-41.
5 See U.N. CHARTER, Preamble and arts. 1, 55 - 56.
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In addition, Alfaro was promised that an agreement on
human rights would be given a priority in the work of the
United Nations. This promise was kept. The Commission on
Human Rights was established as a second step in the first
meeting of the General Assembly' First, the Assembly appointed the Economic and Social Council, and the Economic and
Social Council met and established immediately this Commission. That was the beginning of the story.
You have heard quite a lot about what was happening in
the Commission. Of course, there was a combination of actors.
All those declarations prepared by NGOs were there, all the national constitutions that contained proper phrases. For example, the Weimar Constitution 6 had quite a number. In fact,
some of the German documents go as far back as 1794, a document published in Prussia.
So those things were nicely put together and presented to
this Commission. But they looked at those things, said there
was too much for them to look at, and the Secretariat made kind
of a summary and from that summary they worked. Under the
leadership of Mrs. Roosevelt, the Commission started to prepare a text of the International Bill of Rights. The situation
became complicated when several countries started to insist
that practically no proposed text was generally acceptable, as a
variety of exceptions was required in order to incorporate all the
exceptions existing in their national constitutions. They were
told, however, that they should speed the drafting, because several disputes about human rights were already presented to the
U.N. General Assembly.
One of these early cases before the United Nations was
South Africa and its treatment of Indians in South Africa. This
occurred because India, once it became an independent state,
immediately brought the case to the United Nations saying "the
Indians in South Africa are being discriminated against, and
here it says in the Charter no discrimination on the basis of
race or nationality." So there was immediately a big discussion
6 The Weimar Constitution established the German Republic that was eventually dissolved under the Nazi regime. The Constitution was formally promulgated on August 11, 1919. See Winona State University, Winona, MN, German
History (visited April 6, 1999) <http://www2.winona.msus.edu/ghistory/
weimarco.htm>.
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whether those provisions are binding or not binding. The result, however, was that the United Nations adopted a resolution
telling South Africa to "behave yourself," and that was the beginning of a long story.
The second case that came immediately was Russia. What
happened was that during the war the American and British
flyers who were bombing Germany who did not have enough gas
to get back to London had to go and land in the Soviet Union,
and some of them married Russian girls. As a result, after the
war they wanted to take those girls with them back home.
One of them was a Chilean. His father was appointed Ambassador to Moscow. He went with him there and made sure
that his marriage was registered properly and wanted to take
his wife back. The Soviet Government said, "You cannot do it
because, as you know, in the West wives are prisoners at home
and they are doing all the hard work and they do not even get
paid for it. On the other hand, of course, in Russia you are free
and all can work. You see, for instance, all those women on the
streets. They are cleaning them up. It is not left to men to do it.
Women are willing and able to do it too." And so we had this,
another dispute with the Soviet Union on this subject.
Everybody thought that the group which was preparing the
International Bill of Rights should do something quick. Mrs.
Roosevelt took it to heart. As was pointed out, she was working
them hard, and she got a draft presented to the General Assembly in 1948 and it was adopted.
We have heard that some scholars were studying her collected papers. They might find perhaps a mention that she
wanted to say in her final statement that this document is as
obligatory as the Charter because it is an official interpretation
of the Charter. She was told "no" by the State Department, and
was even told "We order you that you have to say that this is not
a binding instrument."
Perhaps it was not noticed, maybe it does not even appear
in the record, but I was there and I think I heard it. She said,
"At the request of my government, I would like to mention that
of course that wonderful document that we have adopted is not
yet a binding document." In that little phrase she managed to
point out that this statement did not reflect her point of view
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but her government's point of view. So that is the second clarification that I wish to make.
The third issue I would like to discuss happened about
1968, when the Universal Declaration became binding. It was
the twentieth anniversary. Various things were being prepared
at that time. I think Mr. Gardner at that time was in charge of
preparing a volume on the subject. The government wanted to
say that this document is very important. It was not clear that
the government was ready to accept all of its provisions as
binding.
I happened to be asked by one of the NGOs whether I would
be willing to have a conference in Montreal on this subject. I
agreed and a document of the Montreal Conference was published by the Johnson Foundation, of Racine, Wisconsin. It
states that, among other things, that by now, because many
governments had been following this document (in fact, there
were two other United Nations Declarations - on colonialism
and racial discrimination) - - those Declarations plus the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have now become binding
documents as a result.
The Conference in Montreal was composed of people collected from all around the world, including a young man from
Iran that we thought might be in charge of the Iranian supervision of the negotiations in Teheran later that year at the first
human rights conference. At that conference, after some discussion, we agreed that various improvements were necessary, including a clarification of the status of the Declaration and we
drafted a nice Declaration of Montreal, suggesting various improvements and sent it to Teheran.
At Teheran the usual happened. People started arguing
about apartheid in South Africa, about the treatment of Palestinians by Israel, and a few other subjects. As a result of that,
they never were coming to anything concrete.
The Persian princess, sister of the ruling Shah, was in
charge of the conference because she presided over the Commission on Human Rights when this conference was agreed upon,
told Mr. Manoucheht Ganji "do something about it."
So he collected some of the persons that we had in Montreal
and together they drafted a document. They did not call it a
declaration. It became a Proclamation of Teheran. In it was a

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss1/5
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nice little sentence, that because countries had been relying on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, therefore by practice of states this Declaration has now become a binding document. That was then sent to the General Assembly, which
immediately approved it.
Of course, in my speech that I had planned to make I have
many other things I would like to say, but maybe I will just
concentrate on one more, namely, what is happening now.
Any document I receive, whether from the United Nations
or from other countries or from NGOs, has now got economic
and social rights as being a priority for the next generation. For
the first time, the Commission on Human Rights, which is a
relatively conservative body composed of governments' representatives, appointed a special rapporteur on the question of extreme poverty, what can be done about that. Another one was
appointed on another subject. And, as you know, there are several studying the condition of women in various parts of the
world.
This matter always emphasizes economic and social rights
- the right to education, for instance, which is important basically over anything else; the right to a job; the right to health;
the right to family happiness. All those things flow from the
Charter; they are mentioned in the Charter. Now they are saying they have to be executed.
What I want to say is that there is another problem. Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt at some point made it very clear. There is a
volume of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace,
that contains a report in the preparation of which Mrs.
Roosevelt participated. She said then that maybe the Covenants are not enough. She also noted that they were not completed in the 1960s, and that humanity cannot wait forever for
their completion. Something should be done about it.
She said, "The only thing we have to do is to work one by
one. Let's start with some things that are clearly prohibited by
the Charter, such as racial discrimination and discrimination
against women. Let's concentrate on these two subjects."
As we know, that actually happened. At first, only Declarations on the subjects were adopted. They followed by conven-

9

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 11:71

7
tions; conventions, especially the one on racial discrimination,
have very good provisions about enforcement as well. So that
was the beginning. By now, we have more than sixty documents of that kind, and practically every human right of the
first part, you might say, of the Declaration has been taken care
of.
On the other hand, almost nothing was done about the second part of the Universal Declaration that deals with economic,
social and cultural rights. So my message for this conference
and for the other organizations that have been discussing this is
that all rights are equal, all rights are important, and because
those rights have been neglected, the next generation has to do
what my generation and the current second generation have neglected to do. As most of the people here are probably of the
second generation, I am really speaking to the third generation,
which is starting to end schooling and is looking for what still
needs to be done. I hope that they will soon realize that the
next thing to be done is to make sure that, in addition to political and civil rights, also economic, social, and cultural rights
have to be generally accepted and that everything necessary for
it should be done now, not in a distant future.
My final sentence is that all human beings - men, women,
and children are entitled to all human rights all the time. Today, for instance, many think that if somebody immigrated to
the United States illegally he or she is not entitled to any
rights, and we had to fight quite a lot before we were able to
persuade some courts that illegal immigrants that are put in
jail pending a decision on their future are entitled to some
rights, at least the same rights as other prisoners.

7 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 60 UNTS 15 (March 7, 1966).
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Georges Abi-Saab
GraduateInstitute of InternationalStudies (Geneva),
Global Professor, N.Y. U. Law School

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to be here
with you today and to have the opportunity to speak on this
panel under the supervision of my teacher, Professor Sohn. So I
feel again like a student who is passing an exam. In fact, I take
my cue from his last sentence. The theme of what I wanted to
discuss today is a continuation of his conclusion.
The theme of this roundtable is "From Ideal to Law to Practice: The Universal Declaration Today and Tomorrow." This title makes two presumptions. First, it assumes a linear path of
progress of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from
the articulation of an idea, to its transformation into law in the
books, to its translation into actions through practice.
But, in fact, the Universal Declaration is not simply another example of social values hardening into law, which is assumed by this title. It was also a proclamation of a pregnant set
of ideas, a perception and understanding of which has also
evolved over time. The evolution of our perception has had an
influence on its translation into law and then into practice and
into our actual evaluation of the importance of what has been
achieved already, and what is still before us if we really want to
fulfill the promise.
Moreover, the assumption is that the Declaration has
evolved as one unit. But, in fact, it is a very complex document
and the different parts have taken different paths of evolution.
That is in fact a very important point.
The other presumption is that we can look at it today in
order to foresee tomorrow. But I think that in order to foresee
tomorrow from today in a geometric way we have to see where
we started from. We have to go to "then" and "now" before
speaking of "today" and "tomorrow."
Human rights, in fact, are the enlightenment's version - a
reformulation - of the eternal quest of man for liberty and
equality in society. As such, they really started as a philosophi-
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cal representation which served as a basis of a political struggle, and started in fact at the same time as the rise of the state
as the main form of social organization, the state being represented at that time by absolute monarchies. But, as a result,
state power needed a counterweight, and human rights were
the philosophical weapon for an argument for limited
government.
On the legal level, then human rights were basically a
struggle in constitutional terms within national communities.
They were not an international struggle.
It took more than two centuries and the horrors of World
War II to transform human rights into a question of international concern and their regulation making entrance on the international scene via the shortcut of the United Nations, which
designated human rights as a choice area for international cooperation. That is Article 1, Paragraph 3.
The place of the Universal Declaration in the initial U.N.
agenda for human rights, as reflected in the mandate which
was given to the Commission on Human Rights at its inception,
was to chart the ground of this new field of cooperation, so it is a
kind of a surveyor's action - and also to serve as a blueprint of
the edifice that had to be built on that ground. So it is basically
a chart and a blueprint which includes a certain structure and a
certain architecture in the blueprint itself.
As a chart, it has weathered well the half-century of its life. It
has not enlarged very much. We have enlarged it on the periphery, on things like the right to a healthy environment. While
there are many, many other human rights which have been articulated, most of them were, by necessity, implications from
the rights mentioned at the inception.
For example, the great absence in the Declaration is the
right to self-determination and collective rights, but this right is
really a necessary premise of political rights. It is a necessary
condition for the full fulfillment and enjoyment of political
rights. So, it is not a sufficient condition, but it is a necessary
condition, because we cannot give political rights to individuals
if together they cannot end up choosing and deciding their fate.
The same can be said about the right to development in relation
to social and economic rights.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss1/5
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But if we look at the Declaration as a blueprint and we consider the structure and the architecture which is reflected in it,
one obvious feature stands out. It is featured even in its name.
It is the adjective "universal."
However, universality has two faces. One of them is obvious; the other is less obvious. The obvious face of universality is
universalitirationg persona. In fact, this was the promise of
the United Nations before its organization. The United Nations
started as a denomination of the Allied powers fighting against
the Axis.
The promise of rights to everybody everywhere was in the
Atlantic Charter. Professor Sohn mentioned Roosevelt's "Four
Freedoms" which was in the Declaration of the United Nations.'
It was in the name of these freedoms, which were supposed to
be brought to everybody in the world, that the Allies solicited
the support of all peoples of the world, including non-independent people as well.
Now, unlike earlier declarations, which spoke the language
of all men but in reality addressed only certain categories of
men within their ambit, this was addressed to all men and women both in language and intent. I say that because the American Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights 2 spoke of
"all men," but at the time there was a kind of a genocide of the
original inhabitants, and it took another century to come to
grips with slavery. So while they spoke the language of "all
men," they were not addressed to all men within the realm of
the document.
The same situation existed with the French Revolution and
the famous Declarations of the Rights of Man and Citizens, 3 because it did not apply to the inhabitants of the colonies. And,
although the French Revolution eliminated slavery for a short
time, it was very quickly reinstated by Napoleon. Again, it took
not another century, but fifty years, to get rid of slavery.
1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT,

1940,

War and Aid to Democracies 663, 672 (1941).
2 See Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
3 See Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France 1789) (visited April 6, 1999) <http://www.thehallway.com/bookdeclarationsof
therightsofman.htm>.
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So these were rhetorical declarations, while the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, for the first time, was addressed
to all human beings and attached to every one of them by the
fact of being a human being without any qualification. This became even more important in the elaboration - which made
discrimination, on whatever grounds, a cardinal violation.
This, of course, is a very simple idea, but it is a very revolutionary one. It has very far-reaching implications. But we still
have a long way to go really to fulfill the promise of universalitg
rationgpersona.

The less obvious face of universality of the Declaration is
universalitM rationg materia. Again, for the first time, compared

to earlier historical proclamations, the Declaration encompassed the whole range of rights featured in the human rights
philosophical-political debate at the time, as reflected in
Roosevelt's Four Freedoms.
Now, three of these freedoms are freedoms in the sense of
being free from something. But the fourth, freedom from want,
was something new. It was not new internally, because there
was great struggle and many revolutions for social justice. But
it was new on the international level.
Indeed, Articles 22 to 28 of the Declaration proclaim a set of
economic, social, and cultural rights strongly inspired, in fact,
by many documents prepared in the United States, including
the American Law Institute document which really parallels
very well these six articles.
Now, the structure and nature of the relationships between
the different categories of human rights implied in the architecture of the Declaration was later articulated and ritualistically
reiterated, for example, in the Vienna Declaration of 1993, 4 in
terms of their being indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. This is, unfortunately, the redundancy of the U.N. languages. But it means that you cannot separate them any way
without doing great harm to both or effecting a refutation of any
hierarchy between them. The uniqueness of the Declaration is
in the unicorn it creates by presenting one bundle of rights.
4

See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/conf. 157/23

(1993).
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But unfortunately, it is precisely on this point that the edifice that was built in the form of legal documents, and then in
the practice which followed, has not followed the blueprint.
This deviation from the initial design started immediately
after the Proclamation of the Universal Declaration, when at
the beginning, in the Fourth Session, the General Assembly decided to have one Covenant. In the following session, the Fifth
Session, they decided to separate them, thus making room for
different treatment as to the stringency of the obligations and
as to the mechanisms of monitoring and implementation.
This differentiation was reflected in the outcome of the two
documents which were supposed to translate the Declaration
into legal obligations, the two Covenants which were adopted in
1966 by the General Assembly.
When the first U.N. Conference on Human Rights met in
Teheran in 1968, as Professor Sohn mentioned, it decided to put
the emphasis on implementation. This conference reflected a
very, very important shift in our way of conceiving and analyzing human rights and diagnosing the problems with the
implementation.
Up until then the attitude was very legalistic, meaning that
it was micro-analytical and violations were taken in isolation,
set against the standard, and judged on that basis. The great
advantage was to make them justiciable, and the right is justiciable if it can be decided in this way. So it was a little bit excluded from the context.
In Teheran, there was a paradigm shift in explaining
things because the emphasis was on identifying the basic environmental conditions which would lead to full enjoyment of
human rights. There, in the way of social medicine, rather than
a specific case of someone who is ill, the conditions which lead to
violations and which make for the full implementation and full
enjoyment were taken into consideration macro-analytically,
not micro-analytically. These were, of course, conditions of
peace, self-determination, development; and, on the other side,
oppression, exploitation, et cetera, as environmental conditions
which must be treated if we want to increase the probabilities of
having the rights respected. Of course, that led to even more
increasing implications of the two categories, because it showed
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to a greater extent the interrelationship between the full enjoyment of one and the full enjoyment of the other.
From then on, if we look at what happened in Teheran, we
find that there have been many achievements, particularly in
the area of civil and political rights. These came first in the concretization and articulation in greater detail of rights, and of
creating monitoring or organizations on rendering these rights
justiciable. The case of Pinochet, for example, now is a very interesting case. So we could say there has been a lot of
achievement.
However, if this is true, then why is it that, on the eve of5
the Second U.N. Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993,
there was a great gloom and a feeling of impeding crisis and
everybody was afraid that something bad would happen in the
conference? In fact, there was a real fear that this edifice, patiently built, might be partly undone; or, even worse, that mines
would be put under some of its main pillars, possibly causing it
to flounder.
This was because everybody was speaking of the crisis of
universality. In fact, this thrust of human rights had been in
the meantime subjected to two radical challenges. One of them
is clear, and it was mentioned and discussed at length, and this
is the question of cultural relativism. It came basically to the
forum with the Iranian revolution and the challenge of the
universality of human rights from that point of view, but it was
enlarged later to the whole argument of cultural relativism.
Now, I have to say something about this when we speak of
cultural relativism. Because you are here in the United States
one must keep aside for a minute intellectual arguments. There
is a great difference between this challenge and the next challenge I will mention, in that those who challenged the universality of the version of human rights which was mentioned,
challenged it in name - they did not challenge human rights or
the values which were enshrined in human rights. They said,
'We have an alternative set which is superior," and that is a
different type of challenge. There is a challenge when you say
"the right does not exist" and another challenge when you say
"why should we accept this if we have a better system?"
5 See id.
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Now, I know in many cases this argument is really a ploy,
and it is used for other reasons. But, still, I think that this challenge is manageable because it is subject to discussion, to negotiation, to asking for proof of supposed superiority. But it needs
some open minds to deal with it.
Even if you take Islam - I am not a Moslem myself,
although I am an Egyptian - but in Islam the points which are
most critical have been subject to many interpretations; they
are not subject to one interpretation. So one can deal with it if
you accept the premise that human rights, or the values underlying human rights, are common. You can go somewhere from
there.
Still, why is it that this was mentioned there? It was mentioned because, in many cases it was a ploy, as I said. It was a
ploy as a result of frustration which came from the fact that
many of these people considered that they were denied in reality equality of opportunity. They did not have a voice on the
international level, they did not have the possibilities of developing and becoming on equal footing with the others, so there
was a return to one's own tradition and to one's own identity.
This brings me to a second challenge. Now, the second
challenge is in fact what happened to the other part of human
rights, the social, economic, and cultural rights. In fact, very
little has happened. We do not have the specification, or the
standard-setting level compared to the degree of specification
we have on the other side, and everything now turns around a
sterile discussion of the right to development.
I agree with Professor Sohn that there have been appointments of special rapporteurs, but there is really a feeling of
turning around and the more you get, the less you achieve
under any item.
The Covenant 6 did not have a monitoring organ. It was created by the General Assembly. In spite of the valiant efforts of
the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and
particularly of its outgoing President, who did really a marvelous job of trying to specify the criteria by which performance
can be decided, it did not go very far.
6 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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This is the result of two things. First, because of the very
great ideological challenge to human rights by the negation of
economic, social, and cultural rights as human rights. That was
the official policy of the Reagan Administration.
I live in Geneva. Maurice Abrams, who was a representative of the United States, was running everywhere, giving lectures saying it is an intellectual aberration to speak of these as
human rights. So that is really the radical negation of half of
human rights, if not more. This is the half that touches most of
humanity in its flesh, in the way it lives.
Human rights have been a reaction to feelings of injustice,
to feelings of deprivation. You feel what you lack much more
than what you have. You formulate it in terms of what has to
be done, and this becomes a social value. If there is enough insistence on it, it becomes a right.
That is the real problem with the future: today and tomorrow, and this is my conclusion. How can we ensure that we
go ahead, not with only one part or a second part. If we try to
say "there is a minimum and that minimum should be safeguarded," this minimum may not correspond with what somebody else considers as his minimum.
I have a formula in two parts. The first is - and this is
very heterodox, very unorthodox - that we should de-secularize the discussion of human rights. Speaking of sacred, speaking of coming from God or Allah or whatever, is not true. It is
not true. It is not true even to say "men are born free and
equal" by someone who had slaves. It is just not true. It is a
rhetorical device.
We should discuss the legal protection of supreme values of
all the components of the international community. To have a
real Bill of Human Rights which is not only put on paper, but
which is felt and lived by, it must reflect a composite minimum
of what each of the different components feels most strongly
about. It is only by such a composite minimum that we can
have a bundle of human rights which corresponds with the Universal Declaration and which will be accepted and lived by, constituting the standard of civilization, instead of "a" civilization
- not the Western, the Eastern, the Northern, the Southern
civilization - but the actual universal civilization of the world
at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st
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century, and where everybody can identify with it, fight for it,
and ask for it.
Thank you very much.
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Theodor Meron
New York University Law School
I am delighted to join my teacher and mentor Louis Sohn
and my friends Georges Abi-Saab and Paul Chevigny on this
panel.
Let me start by discussing some of the achievements of the
Universal Declaration.'
I need not tell you what tremendous success human rights
has had as law, as a living discipline, and as a movement. From
the moral and rhetorical, human rights have been transformed
into a system of legal entitlements protecting human dignity.
We have developed not only a comprehensive corpus of human
rights, but also important mechanisms and procedures for ensuring respect for those human rights, systems based on treaties and on customary roles to some extent, drawing on the
human rights clauses in the United Nations Charter. 2
We have done this both on the universal and on the regional planes. The principle of international accountability has
been broadly accepted. Governments recognize that they must
account to the international community for the way they treat
their own peoples. That basic human rights constitute obligations ergo omnes is not really questioned.
The readiness of the Security Council, at least in some
cases, to decide that gross violations of human rights and humanitarian norms constitute a threat to international peace
and security, justifying the invocation of Chapter 7 of the
United Nations Charter, 3 opened new possibilities for
enforcement.
The normative density and significance of the Universal
Declaration are now drastically different from what they were
in the beginning; No longer just a standard of achievement, the
bulk of the provisions of the Universal Declaration is accepted
today as binding norms.
1 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948.
2 See U.N. Charter, 1 UNTS XVI (Jan 26, 1945).
3 See id.
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Human rights, with its emphasis on opinio juris as the
principal element for the development of the law, is having also
a major impact on the development of international customary
law in other areas of international law, those areas in which
fundamental values are important for the survival and the success of the international community.
I would like just to mention one example of the impact that
human rights law is having on other normative systems of protection, humanitarian law or the law of war. Classically and
historically a system which operated between sovereign states,
international humanitarian law / law of war is actually being
rewritten to accommodate and to take account of some major
human rights concerns.
The circle of beneficiaries of human rights has also been
drastically changed. From the focus on primarily political opponents and prisoners of conscience, we now include additional
beneficiaries - women and children, prisoners, the disabled and, in armed conflicts, the entire population of countries.
It is not only human rights law that we must take into the
calculus. International humanitarian law has importantly added to the normative arsenal of protections in those situations.
Human rights treaties, the progeny of the Universal Declaration, have been widely ratified, and customary human rights
law or principles of international law recognizing human rights
have rapidly grown.
Through customary law and treaties, international human
rights has become - and is becoming - the positive law of nation states and of the international community. Scholars have
developed a variety of strategies and doctrines to make human
rights binding on an international basis, even for states which
have not ratified some human rights instruments.
A recent development of great importance has been the
criminalization of certain violations of international humanitarian law. The norms of international humanitarian law that we
have criminalized often overlap with fundamental human
rights norms. So, for the first time, we see the emergence of a
real possibility to apply some criminal law strategies to violations of human rights, not only of humanitarian law. The developments in Rome are just the last stage in this development.
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But what about weaknesses? The achievements which I.
have mentioned have been accompanied by many weaknesses
- for example, the breadth and the number of reservations to
human rights treaties, politicization, selectivity in the application of norms. If the true test of human rights is the application
of human rights domestically by governments in their countries
toward their populations, then the fact that we see so many reservations, and such far-reaching reservations, would suggest
that some of those tests of effectiveness have not been met.
It is only proper that I should single out for particular criticism the reservations that the United States has made, for example, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 4 reservations which are extremely far-reaching, and
emasculate some of the norms stated in the Covenant. The
human rights movement should have on its future agenda a
campaign for the withdrawal of some reservations.
Our assumption has always been that democracies are
human rights-friendly. And of course we live in a great democracy, but it can be -

and should be -

pointed out that our own

federal system has been unable to bring about a change in our
laws and statutes in order to comply with the obligations that,
were it not for the reservations, would result from the Covenants or treaties to which we have adhered.
This reluctance, this inability of our system to accommodate human rights, to change our laws, results from a perception that our own constitutional system is superior.
I would like to say a few words about economic deprivation.
We international lawyers have always found it somewhat difficult to grapple with economic rights, especially because the Economic Covenant 5 provides only for a progressive realization of
economic rights, a realization which is related to the availability of economic resources. It has not been easy to articulate the
core obligations which can be distilled from those provisions of
the Covenant.
4 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A
(XMI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. no. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
5 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. no. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
(CHECK CITE).
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The Committee on Economic Rights has tried to articulate
some such core obligations, but recently the trends toward
globalization, privatization, conditions of extreme economic
competition, the struggle for economic survival, have combined
with various economic crises to bring about a retrenchment in
domestic systems of economic and social safety nets, which in
the past have been historically provided by government and
public institutions. This is true also of rich and developed
states. These cuts, this retrenchment, sometimes reach an extent where human dignity is called into question and the possibility of enjoyment of political and civil rights is seriously
impaired.
While trends toward privatization and globalization are
perhaps inevitable, and in some cases beneficial, states cannot
ignore the fact that these developments are having a severe impact on the needs of large groups of the population and on the
possibility of a meaningful enjoyment of civil and political
rights. This, again, applies not only in the poor or medium-poor
countries; this is true - and look at the recent United Nations
Development Report - also of our own country, the United
States. With the decline of regulation by states of economic and
social activity, can market forces really be expected to accommodate economic rights and economic expectations? The assumptions that were common at the time the Universal Declaration
was adopted - even in 1966, when the International Covenant
was adopted - that states have and will maintain a fairly large
measure of regulation of economic and social activity, may no
longer be true.
Let me turn, briefly, to the challenge of non-governmental
actors.
Accepted the human rights doctrines suggest that obligations run from governments to people. However, non-governmental actors are having an increasing impact on human
dignity and on human rights. We must consider a human
rights agenda, or a research agenda, which takes these developments into account, even at the cost of theoretical purity, and
'tries to articulate human rights principles which can effectively
be addressed to non-governmental actors.
The collapse of security structures in many countries, the
fact that many states are in a state of security collapse, the col-
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lapse of judicial and prosecutorial systems in many countries,
and the increasing role of insurgencies, of rebel movements, and
other non-government actors, must be addressed.
We have some language in human rights and humanitarian
law treaties which appears to be relevant, as, for example,
through due diligence, and state responsibility. But this has not
been effective.
Terrorism - how do we relate human rights to terrorism?
The Human Rights Commission of the U.N. has recently
adopted a number of resolutions on human rights and terrorism. It characterized terrorism in some cases as aggression.
Many states have abstained because they still believe that it
would be wrong to articulate complaints other than to
governments.
The mention of aggression by the Human Rights Commission only rhetorical? Look at the security situation in and
around the Congo. Is trans-boundary aggression by non-governmental forces still only theoretical? And do we have in the
international law an arsenal of norms that addresses those
issues?
The United States has justified the attack on the Bin Laden
compound in Afghanistan on grounds of self-defense. We really
must come to grips with the international legal issues that all
this presents.
Privatization can be very good. It can also be problematic.
It clearly presents challenges. With regard, for instance, to security services, correctional facilities? What is the real impact
of all that on due diligence duties, on the effectiveness and concreteness of state obligations.
Perhaps because of the lack of clarity regarding the effective addressees of international norms, a criminal strategy can
be more effective because it addresses individual responsibility.
People who commit atrocities could be brought to justice before
courts of third states under the universality of jurisdiction
principle.
Finally, let me say a few words about the Rome Statute on
the International Criminal Court. Here the most important development, no doubt, has been the adoption of an expansive
statement of crimes against humanity. This is particularly im-
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portant because of the deletion and abandonment of any nexus
with armed conflict, whether international or internal.
And also, what is extremely important with regard to
crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute, is that we
have dropped the requirement that crimes against humanity
could only be committed by governments. It is enough if they
would be in pursuance of a policy followed by other organizations or institutions.
We have also criminalized violations of Common Article 3
of the Geneva Convention.6 If you read the statement of crimes
against humanity in the ICC Statute together with the provisions of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, you realize that
some of the norms stated there are clearly indistinguishable
from basic fundamental provisions of human rights.
Thank you very much.

6

See Geneva Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
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QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
Q: I would like to comment on an interesting point, actually something that Professor Meron mentioned, which picks up
on something that Professor Gardner mentioned earlier this
morning. Professor Meron said something like 'this, that
human rights is about the way other governments treat their
people. Professor Gardner this morning said that human rights
is about the way other governments treat their citizens.
Now, there is a two-way street. It is not about how other
governments treat their citizens. It is also about governments
treating other citizens. In fact, it is about individuals, not as
citizens but as human beings. This is indeed something that
most people are unable to perceive. How can we look at individuals not as citizens but as human beings, which raises the international legal issue of the roles and standards of the individual
as a person of public international law, and certainly challenges
the classical definition of sovereignty? We are here facing and
challenging the old, traditional understanding and definition of
sovereignty.
Which takes me to another point which I would like to challenge, which was raised by Professor Abi-Saab, who dismissed
the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizens as rhetorical
dimensions, when this is not so. It is something like Professor
Gardner said this morning, that words by themselves have no
power.
No. I believe that words do have their own power. I concede that, as far as the American Declaration of Independence
is concerned, that it certainly has a lot of problems, and I concede that it may have taken two centuries to realize the abolition of slavery and the civil rights reforms of this century, of the
19th century. But it could all be traced to the Declaration of
Independence and its human rights content.
Similarly, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizens has since then unquestionably been the root of the parallel development in secular civil and human rights within the
Continent of Europe.
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The effect of and influence of the two great declarations
merged in 1948, I believe, in the form of the Declaration that we
are celebrating today.
Thank you.
PROF. CHEVIGNY: Comments? Professor Meron
PROF. MERON:
It seems to me if I emphasized protections and duties by
governments vis-a-vis their own citizens, then I said something
that I should not have said. Of course, governments are also
responsible vis-a-vis their citizens, but it is one of the great
characteristics of human rights that they are basically passport
blind. They apply to people within the country. You can find
language to that effect both in the Universal Declaration and in
Article 2, for example, of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
Not only do they - except for some political freedoms, such
as voting or election or the right to be elected - apply to everybody in the country, but over the years we have seen, fortunately, an interpretation of the political covenant which gave
the covenant some extraterritorial effect outside of the territory
of the state. For example, where agents of the governmental
apparatus outside of one's country subject foreigners to the
power of those institutions, albeit it even temporarily, it is now
clear under accepted international human rights law doctrine
that the obligations of the state apply also outside of the territory of the state. In those cases, of course, most of the beneficiaries of those protections would be aliens, would not be
citizens.
PROF. CHEVIGNY: Professor Sohn?
PROF. SOHN:
I would like to emphasize the fact that each declaration of
human rights usually deals with a problem that was created
before, and therefore they are trying to deal really with something that they do not want to happen again. The United States
Declaration was clearly of that kind. As you can see from the
Declaration of Independence itself very clearly, they eschewed
all those things that the British kings had done to them. There-

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss1/5

28

1999]

IDEAL TO LAW TO PRACTICE

fore, they say "we not only do not want those things done by the
British kings, but we want to be sure that our own rulers are
not going to do those things to us." Therefore, we are making
very clear that our new government that we are establishing is
not entitled to do all those things that the British kings were
trying to do to us. That was one thing.
Second, international law in the past was very much defending foreigners rather than nationals, because that was the
idea, that a government was responsible for what happens to its
citizens abroad. Therefore, if people in other countries have
done something wrong, the government started intervening.
The whole history of the 19th century, in particular, has been
always you interfere somewhere because they have done something to your citizens, not to their citizens. When it came to
what somebody was doing to their own citizens, then we said "it
is just too bad," but we should not interfere with what a country
is doing at home.
The change made by the Universal Declaration was that
now you are supposed to be concerned with what happens to
anybody anywhere. This was a great change, especially in the
way that we have started now interpreting the case that was
cited of the Chilean President. It is exactly the case saying that
Spain is entitled to do something to the Chilean President for
what he has done supposedly in Chile. But, in a way, that goes
back really to the old one, saying that the Spanish Government
could not do anything to the Chilean before, but it has now gotten international permission that, even when the president is of
a foreign country, the person can be caught and have something
done to him.
The same thing we are now doing to various people who
have committed some crimes in Bosnia. We wait for them to
show up somewhere else and we grab them at that point. We
are now saying, "It does not matter what you commit, to whom
you commit; if we have a chance to get at you, you are going to
be punished."
Q: I wondered whether anybody would speak to the question of the possible application of human rights rules to corporations. When the United States made its Bill of Rights, I think
corporations were small, and I doubt very much that anybody
imagined that the Bill of Rights or anything else should apply to
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them. But now, in the United States through campaign contributions, throughout the world and probably also including the
United States through bribes and other mechanisms, large corporations have a tremendous amount of power, and as employers they have a large amount of power. One wonders whether
they should be subject to these rules. I throw that out as a
question.
PROF. CHEVIGNY: Does anybody want to comment on that?
PROF. SOHN:
I could give one example that people did not know even that
existed. Namely, in the Marshall Plan we needed not only resources from the United States but also from other countries,
especially Latin America. Our government then enacted the
law that said that if an American company is using, say, Brazil
as a place for producing things that they are going to send
under the Marshall Plan to Europe, they have to observe the
international law of the subjects, namely the Convention of the
International Labor Organization, in the treatment of their
workers in Brazil under those conventions, and therefore they
would be punished if they do not. Therefore, that was one example of corporations doing something abroad that could then
be punished at home for having done it.
PROF. CHEVIGNY: Professor Abi-Saab?
PROF. ABI-SAAB:
There is what is known as the lateral problem of human
rights, because indeed the legal regulation usually envisages
the relationship as one between the residents, not necessarily
the citizens, and the government under whose authority they
live. But of course you know that there is this business of respecting and protecting human rights. The obligation of the
government is not only to respect but to protect, and the idea of
protecting is protecting because there is this lateral relationship, once human rights can be threatened not only by authority but by the other citizens.
Of course, when it comes to concentrations of power, as we
are seeing now - it has always existed, but it is even magnified
now - in economic power, and the danger is much greater.
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Now, the problem is not as to the basis, because the basis is
there. The problem is that the regulation has not really been
done on the basis of that model, and so it was treated usually as
a peripheral question. I think we have to think in terms of
norms of application which take that much more into
consideration.
I just want to add a footnote to what Dr. Mugraby has said.
I did not scuttle at all the French Declaration or the American
Declaration of Independence. What I said was that there was a
hiatus between the rhetoric and the real addressees at the time.
But over time the rhetoric remains. That is why we hate, when
we speak of law-making treaties, we hate to look into travaille
preparatoire. We take the words for what they are and forget in
order to give them more power. Of course, these are great historical documents and they have inspired a lot of people. But I
just wanted to say that in relation to the Universal Declarations
there was no hiatus between what was said and what was
intended.
Q: I just wanted to comment on the corporate question
and then direct a question to Professor Meron.
Essentially in terms of cost, probably the most productive
way to look at this is through the issue of sanctions. Studies
recently have shown, for example, that whenever the United
States, for example, enacts some program of sanctions against a
particular country, it in effect shifts the burden of the cost of
those sanctions to the corporate sector. So, reluctant as the corporate sector may be, it does carry the cost of those sanctions.
If one looks at the transformation of South Africa, I do not
think that anyone denies the role of, say, David Rockefeller,
whose essential initiative in withdrawing trade with the South
African regime in 1985 resulted essentially in a crisis of economic confidence in South Africa and actually played a significant role in the enactment therefore of the Anti-Apartheid Act
of South Africa, which ultimately led to the accelerated process
of transformation.
Now my question to Dr. Meron. He had talked to the technical question of the expansion of the sources of international
law and the role that human rights processes have played in
broadening those standards. He focused, of course, on the international side of it and he focused on the regional side of it, but
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he did not mention what I consider to be one of the most dramatic developments, which is the redesign of constitutional systems of the post-Cold War new orders.
I have given the specific examples. The South Africa Constitution is probably the most human rights-sensitive constitution currently. The Ugandan Constitution is quite impressive
in human rights terms. Certainly, the conditions of transformation in the Balkans were tied to human rights performance as a
benefit.
So I was just a bit curious about that. Even the Canadian
Supreme Court most recently came out with a quite impressive
decision on self-determination with respect to the situation of
Quebec. So I am curious about that omission from the analysis.
PROF. MERON:
The omission resulted simply from lack of time.
PROF. CHEVIGNY:
Now is your chance.
PROF. MERON:
There is no question that the inclusion of values drawn
from the Universal Declaration and human rights instruments
in domestic laws and in constitutions of many nations is of critical importance for the real test of human rights, which is, as I
said, the domestic application. So definitely.
I will not speak at length on that, simply because I agree
with everything that you have said. But I would like perhaps to
take it somewhat further and point to a very interesting technique which has been resorted to by the Council of Europe in
order to promote some human rights values.
As you are aware, the Council of Europe has taken the position that countries that would like to join the system of Strasbourg, the system of the Council of Europe - for instance,
countries in the former parts of the former Soviet Union would have to accede not only to the European Convention on
Human Rights, but also to the principal protocols to the European Convention. This is a very interesting way in fact in sort
of coercing, almost forcing, states and governments to accept to
subscribe to human rights commitments, with the incentive of
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joining the Council of Europe. Many of them do so because they
regard the Council of Europe as perhaps a half-way station towards perhaps eventual admission to the European Union, with
all the economic advantages that this would bring.
But here we see how in fact sovereignty is really coerced to
bend, to the extent that, "Yes, you do not have to accede to those
instruments, but then you will not become a member of the institution of which you would like to become a party."
Q: In various presentations made so far at this Celebration, all of the speakers have touched in one way or another on
the importance of economic rights. And yet, as Professor Meron
noted, we live in an age where the ideology of the market is
freedom and the goal of accomplishing anything meaningful in
terms of economic rights seems to be receding, not getting
closer.
Speaking as lawyers, addressing my question to you each
as lawyers, as social engineers: Is there really any purpose in
pursuing this venture any further? As lawyers, where might
you accomplish something meaningful? Several of you have
talked of filling out some of the standards, measurements as to
whether you can say a society is in compliance or not. But is
there really any purpose at this stage to pursuing this venture;
or should we just acknowledge the reality that the economic
rights touched on in the Universal Declaration are, if anything,
further from realization than ever?
PROF. CHEVIGNY: Who wants to attack that first? Professor
Sohn?
PROF. SOHN:
I think what we have in mind really is the fact that economic rights have now become important very much globally,
because to some extent economic rights are connected with the
economic crisis. It goes all the way to Bismarck in the previous
century. When the socialists were getting a lot more votes, he
decided to go ahead of them. He said, "I am going to do it by
government edit, give those rights to workers. That is the way I
will take the wind from their sails." It did not work. They were
still gaining votes. Then he finally said, "All right, we are going
to be just more critical on the subject."
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But now what we are doing is saying "unless you behave
yourself and adopt proper rights for your own citizens, we are
not going to accept it."
Professor Meron has mentioned the Council of Europe,
which is in charge of human rights in this respect, says, "All
right, if you are not behaving properly, we are not going to recognize the credentials of your representative to our meetings.
We are very sorry, but they are not going to be permitted to
speak at our meetings until you behave yourself, because you
promised when you were admitted you were going to do A, B,
and C, and you have not done it. Therefore, your representatives are here under false pretenses, and therefore we do not
permit them to participate." That is one of the sanctions you
,can have.
The United Nations could probably make it wider if they
wanted to. In fact, you might say that sanctions are being applied to the United States at this point. For instance, a few
days ago there was an election of members to the very important committee of the General Assembly which is in charge of
the budget of the United Nations, which the United States originally insisted be established and the fact that the Permanent
Members would be also on it, and the United States was, properly obviously, elected to it. Now, because the United States
does not pay its dues, they said, "All right, therefore they have
nothing to say about the finances of the United Nations," and
our delegate was not elected and somebody else was elected in
his place.
PROF. CHEVIGNY: Professor Abi-Saab?
PROF. ABI-SAAB:
Your question really merits a whole session. You see, I
think, to be very frank, insisting on these rights is really one
way of resisting the universal new religion of "market-theism,"
as I wrote it in one of my articles.
How far can this trend go to dismantle the state - to dismantle the welfare state first? Now we are really cutting even
in the "night watchman state" because if you contract out security and things like that, what remains for the state? So we get
into a new system, perhaps.
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Of course, the whole legal regulation and international law
has to be rethought. But personally, I think that the reliance on
the "invisible hand," which led to social Darwinism with the
mounting international market and industrialization by the
end of the last century/beginning of this century, has created
great dysfunctions and led to great revolutions all over. Moreover, the two reactions, at least European reactions, were the
socialist state/Marxist type, or the welfare state/Keynesian
type. Somehow, these have conditioned to a great extent our
thought.
Now, if you say should we scuttle this, I think that would
mean that the die is cast. I am not sure the die is cast. What
are now social and economic rights or the rights to development
and all that were previously used much more as a sword; now
they are used basically as a shield. There is a minimum beyond
which human beings are not treated as human beings.
Ted mentioned the last report of human development. In
it, one-fifth of humanity, 1.3 billion, live on less than $1.00 a
day. Every day, 36,000 children die from curable diseases.
There are statistics which are really mind-boggling.
If $40 billion is spent every year for ten years, that is 0.016
percent of the national income of the world, you will have essential services, i.e. social services, health, education, et cetera, for
the whole world. Services for the whole world with $40 billion.
That is nothing. Compare it to the military budget of a middlesized country - I am not speaking of the United States.
So all what is being said is that if you go beyond this limit,
we enter into the Rule of the Jungle again. And then, do not
speak of human rights and say "you violate this, you violate
that." There will be chaos that way.
But if conditions of life become very tough for a great majority of humanity, not just for the poor in the developed countries, then why should we speak of human rights? We should
speak of the survival of civil societies. So in a way, that is what
is at stake.
It is very interesting. A few weeks ago, there was a fiftieth
anniversary of GATT in Geneva. Both Clinton and Fidel Castro
were there. Fidel Castro was, of course, the super-star. They
interviewed him on television and said, "What do you think of
globalization?" He said, "I think of globalization as I think
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about the law of gravity. This is something which is happening.
So the question is not globalization; it is how to deal with
globalization." He said, "If we have to use globalization, let's
play the globalization of solidarity, not only globalization of
scuttling everything else."
So I think you cannot read this simply as a technical/legal
question, law rights. Look at the word "right." What is a definition of a right, an individual right? It is a value which law considers as worthy of legal protection or an interest which law
considers as worthy of legal protection. There is a value judgment there. We cannot evaluate the value judgment and treat
it as a technical question.
That is my short answer.
PROF. CHEVIGNY: Thank you very much, gentlemen. It was
extremely good.
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A group of Filipino children hold up a placard in front of the
Chinese consular offices in Manila as part of a demonstration by
the local branch of Amnesty International against alleged
human rights violations in China, including allegations of child
abuse, which Beijing has hotly denied.
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